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The foundation of economic rationalism [1]


Summary: Rationalism is the creed of economists, and the "economic man" assumption is based on rational calculations. But this creed is increasingly being challenged by human social practice. As far as sociology is concerned, the basic question from the classical "how is society possible" is increasingly closely integrated with the basic question of economics, "what is rational behavior," and integration is a question: "It is possible" and placed in the face of the entire social science in the form of transformation of modernity issues. This may provide some kind of opportunity to break the disciplinary barriers formed in the process of social science specialization since the 18th century.

I. Introduction

Economists have acknowledged that the modern versions of economics, in addition to the newly added mathematical descriptions, were basically passed down from Alfred Marshall. The development of economics over the past 100 years can be roughly regarded as the "rationalist movement in economics". 1 Since the two countries have greatly increased the degree of involvement of economists in political and economic policies since the Second World War, the evolution of economic systems has also been certain. To the extent, it follows the path of economic rationalism. In addition to the examples that Weber has studied, a recent example is the options trading system that is rapidly emerging in the process of financial deepening in various countries. In the options market, people buy and sell options almost exclusively according to the Berkell-Shoals pricing theory, and the deviation generally does not exceed 5% of the theoretical price. Accordingly, since 1997, other derivatives trading systems have developed rapidly around this theory. Generally speaking, the creation of various economic systems in the market society is always initiated by entrepreneurs, and then economists interpret them with “rationalization” and thus can be extended to other places. It can be claimed that rationalism is still the creed of mainstream economists.

Because of the many different understandings of the word “rationality”, I must briefly enumerate this interpretation according to its inferential steps before explaining the meaning of “economic rationalism”: economics is the product of British empiricism, not The descendants of the European ethical philosophy. Economists must put their own theories on the basis of empirical research. Economics is "the study of the world", not the study in the study; economists must explain the "daily events" that occur every day and every day, and the basic description of these events can only be statistical, only Those who obey the "mode of principle" event. Among the forces that dominate all everyday events that obey the "dial principle", the two most important and lasting forces are: the self-interested nature of human beings; the religious tendencies of human beings. Economic rationalism insists that human self-interest is the starting point of all economic behavior. This is the core idea of ​​Adam Smith's "The Rich" and the core idea of ​​Becker's 1976 book "The Economic View of Human Behavior", which is considered to be a milestone in "economic imperialism."

However, in the past two decades, the evolution of human society has undergone three important changes closely related to economics, forcing economists to come up with theories that explain these changes. These changes are: the way of economic development and economic growth, the impetus, and the corresponding government policies have changed drastically; technological progress and human capital investment rather than physical capital investment are becoming the main driving force for the economic development and growth of all countries, human society. Entering the so-called "knowledge society". Economists must explain the problems that arise: education, family, marriage, immigration, technological evolution, intellectual property rights, ...; the former socialist economy and the transition from a free-market economy to countries in Africa and Asia’s economically underdeveloped regions. It is not only the economic system that constitutes this “transition”, but also, even more importantly, the wide-ranging changes of the entire society. Economists must explain the social practice and the overall social change process of people who are based on the cultural background of these social systems, and must study such problems: the formation of new behavioral norms, the evolution of psychological preferences, The accumulation of entrepreneurial abilities, the legitimacy of the government, the social self-organization process, the revolution and religious behavior, ...; first proposed from the developed market society, and is becoming the "future" that all market societies have to think about and deal with. Issues, such as the environment and growth limits, economists must understand the prospects of this basic human ecological process and study related issues: minerals and the “reasonable use” of various renewable resources, including the “environment”, population Intergenerational “fairness”, a re-understanding of individual “rationality”, a re-understanding of “humanity” itself, a redefinition of the concept of “happiness”, and a definition of “rights” related to moral and aesthetic issues. Most of these problems have gone beyond the traditional research field of economics, but since their proposal or occurrence is based on the above three economic development issues, people naturally ask economists to give some explanation of economics.

When economists give some sort of "interpretation of economics," the essence of this interpretation must be economic rationalism, otherwise it is not "economic interpretation." Therefore, contemporary economics faces such a dilemma: either insist on economic rationalism, but may have to give up the explanation of many of the above-mentioned major problems; or correct economic rationalism, and thus have to lead to doubts about the economic foundation. Even shaken.

For sociological theory, Husserl’s philosophical problems that entangled with him and cannot be solved—“subjectivity and intersubjectivity”—have always plagued sociologists in his sociological form—“human behavior” Private and social." Classical sociologists have discovered the crisis of modern society; modern sociologists have proposed various "isms" to explain all aspects of social crisis; while contemporary social theorists claim that after the "ontology" is dissolved, "social" essentially It should be understood as a “historical form” that is constantly produced and reproduced in the process of interaction between individuals and other individuals. As Giddens declared in the "anti-materialist declaration", Marx said that "people create history, but cannot choose their own historical situation" is no longer effective for people in contemporary society. When we turn to the vision of contemporary thinkers from the epistemological transition to the new ontology, we cannot ignore McIntyre's criticism: any rationality is rational within the specific thinking tradition. As far as Western tradition is concerned, there are at least three different traditions of thinking: the Aristotelian tradition; the Augustine tradition; and the Scottish enlightenment tradition. In addition, there are a variety of oriental thinking traditions. The rational judgments obtained by individuals in different traditions are conflicting in many respects, and are considered "irrational" by individuals in other rational traditions. Therefore, studying cultural conflicts in the field of "cultural studies" is meaningful, but it cannot provide us with a holistic solution framework. Perhaps Habermas's "communicative rationality" shows the brightest prospects. But as I discussed in the third quarter, the “multi-equilibrium” possibility of social interaction or game process makes the above-mentioned McIntyre criticism have great practical significance. At least “multi-equilibrium” means the height of modern society. stability. So, in my opinion, sociologists, at least those theoretical sociologists, have to ask the classical economists, like the contemporary economists, to ask the classical question that Hegel and Weber repeatedly question: What is rationality?

Second, the meaning of economic "rational"

After the above explained the rational logic of the rationality of economics, the concluding observations are as follows: The first meaning of economic “rationality” is the assumption of “human self-interest”. This is just an instrumental assumption. In Adam Smith, the dual nature of man includes self-interest and sociality. Therefore, there is no opposition between sociology and economics in classical economics. This situation continued until the Schumpeter of the Austrian school and the socialist Weber. However, for the most important economists at present, the social nature of human beings is ultimately based on the so-called "enlightened self-interest" based on human self-interest. Human self-interest is the result of survival competition and social evolution. In other words, the survivors of social competition observed by economists seem to be those who act according to the principle of “self-interest”; those who do not follow the principle of self-interest have died out. The second meaning of economic "rationality" is the "maximization principle." This is the contribution of Marshall's Principles of Economics and the result of the “marginal revolution” initiated by the Austrian school; it follows Bentham's utilitarian moral philosophy of “happiness and suffering” and introduces the “behavioral” behavior. "concept. The individual's pursuit of maximum happiness, or the equivalent pursuit of minimizing “pain”, leads to the “maximization principle” of formal logic. This principle requires that “rational choice” expands happiness to the extent of “marginal” balance: the effort that an individual must make to increase “happiness” by a marginal amount is equal to the pain of this effort. However, in Marshall's view, the most basic and lasting force that determines human behavior is economic and religious. This view has been forgotten by modern economics. According to Saglielson, the influence of religion on human behavior can be reflected by the parameters of the utility function, so that all human behavior can be explained by maximizing the utility function. The third meaning of economic "rationality" is the assumption of consistency between each individual's self-interested behavior and the self-interested behavior of others in the group. This led to a modern view of the "social game." Economics and sociology face common fundamental problems.

First discuss the first meaning above—the self-interest hypothesis. In the eyes of modern economists, this assumption, whether it is assumed to be a hypothesis of the plural phenomenon or a hypothesis of "instrumentalism", is related to Darwin's theory of evolution and the later social evolution and contemporary "social biology." "Study" has a close relationship. The core of this relationship is that people have the survival instinct of animals; and, the material desire of human beings greatly exceeds the extent to which scarce resources can satisfy. So there is a similar law of social competition with "natural selection." But modern economists' views on the "self-interest hypothesis" have already made considerable differences with the founders of classical economics.

David Hume, the culmination of British empiricism, has said in both The Theory of Human Nature and The Theory of Human Understanding that man is a special kind of animal; the desires caused by the high imagination of this animal far exceed the natural environment. The degree of satisfaction can be given, so the "property rights" happened. In Hume’s view, human society defines the “property rights” relationship in order to protect the individual’s source of limited happiness from the intrusion of others’ infinite desires. Hume's discourse on animal psychology and animal ethics, his "atheistic" position publicly expressed in his later years, and the thorough skepticism of his life, are enough to make him a pioneer of Darwinian thought a hundred years later. Despite this, classical economics still does not have the form of evolution in Adam Smith. Smith explained two main ideas in "The Rich": the annual output of a country's total labor can be roughly regarded as a giant measure of a country's national wealth; human self-interest can explain the evolution of human social division of labor. Form, and the decision process of explaining all prices on this basis. The first thought was recognized by the researchers as the “economic table” of the French economist Quinai. Smith’s second main idea, the self-interested nature of human beings, is the core force of social development. According to the research and analysis, it should be influenced by a small poetry collection, The Bee Legend, by the unseen economic historian Monte Weaver. What sings is how evil has become the only driving force for maintaining the long-term prosperity of the hive community. The author doubled the length of the reprint of the collection of poems in 1714. The added part was called "The Bee Legend: The Evil of the Private, the Welfare of the Public, and the Papers on Charity and Charity, and the Exploration of the Nature of Society." In 1729, a third part of the book was added, a long dialogue about the hive community. It clearly states: "... By borrowing this story, I want to explain that the foundation of human society is neither the fraternal nature of our nature nor the virtues of our self-denial, but we call it in the moral world or the natural society. It is the 'evil' thing, it is the first principle that makes us a social animal, the firm foundation of all transactions and employment opportunities, the real life and protection of them. It is there, we must go Explore the true origins of all art and science. It is evil, once it disappears, our society will inevitably collapse...". In "The Theory of Moral Sentiment", Smith criticized his mentor Hutchison's theory of human nature and "the benevolent lover" in two adjacent chapters. He believes that the lack of "love" in his teaching? About 懊 峦 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 摹 浯 浯 浯 浯 浯 浯 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 笤谟谌 ??匀 錾缁岱 錾缁岱 (17) 苟 Φ 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 捶 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻 傻欤澹颍?? 冢 梗 梗 梗 ? 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧 弧Talk about the male form? ㄒ 乇蛔 乇蛔 砸? 砸? A twisted J rate 瞪 ??? Oyster Bureau? 鳎 兜 赖 赖 椴俾邸 椭 椭 椭 椭 椭 椭 椭 椭 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫 鑫濉 ? ? 还 岬 岬 岬 岬 岬 岬 岬 芟嘈 芟嘈 芟嘈 芟嘈 芟嘈 芟嘈 ? ? ? ? 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏 盏? Say dizzy? Was the shackles of the shackles? 颐 芫 芫 ? ? ? ? ? 艿 艿 艿 艿 艿 艿 艿 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 匀 匀 匀 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?凼鋈 淖 淖 ?? 宰 缁岱? 缁岱 17 17 17 Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ Φ 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 种 傻岬 ?? Lai Lu 暮 幕 ? ? ┳ 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖 赖谩 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 砺鄣 砺鄣 砺鄣 砺鄣 砺鄣 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康 康? ??nbsp;
Smith’s dual attitude towards humanity is unacceptable to modern economists. This is first and foremost the result of theoretical evolution: the debate between opposing hypotheses will eventually push the opposite to the extreme. In modern academics, this is manifested in the division of economics and sociology—the former increasingly insists on the principle of human self-interest, and the latter increasingly insists on the principle of social norms restricting individual behavior. In addition, the theory requires the most common phenomena to be explained with the least axioms. Abandoning people's "altruistic assumptions" is a step that economics must take. This was done by two of the best economists in the early 1950s. Ai Zhiren was the first economist to propose "self-interest" as an instrumental hypothesis. With the theoretical foundation of evolution, Ai Zhiren tells us that if we watch a group of cars that are going from Los Angeles to Chicago in Chicago, we don’t know which way they will go in the middle, I don’t know which way there is a gas station, so I don’t know. Which of these cars can reach the finish line. But we know that those cars that have reached the finish line must have chosen a road with gas stations. These drivers can blindly choose the path, but those who arrive at the finish line must have passed the gas station. So, let's assume that "all the cars that were observed in Chicago have rationally chosen the road with gas stations." This is a purely instrumental assumption that does not necessarily correspond to reality. This involves research methods in economics. There have been long-standing debates in economics within economics, most notably Friedman of the University of Chicago in the 1950s on the University of Washington's Silberberg. The former believes that the basic assumptions of economic theory do not have to be tested by reality, but they must have predictive power. The latter insists that the basic assumptions of economics should be tested by reality, otherwise it is reasonable to establish a theoretical model for predicting economic cycles from the cyclical fluctuations of sunspots. Later, Coase, a new institutional economist at the University of Chicago Law School, took the position of Silbberg.

In any case, Friedman’s position is the current mainstream economist’s position, and Ai Zhiren’s evolutionary argument provides the most solid defense for this position. Friedman once proposed a simple stochastic model to prove that a completely irrational consumer who spends money on random walks will eventually be forced to stop at the beginning of the budget line and the indifference curve. This shows that we can instrumentally assume that all consumers are consumers with maximum utility. Thus, starting from the arguments of evolution, after the above-mentioned important methodological turn, economic rationalism puts forward the "utility maximization" hypothesis, or more general "maximization principle." In mathematical expressions, “maximization” is different from “extreme value”; the latter is only a necessary condition for maximization, not a sufficient condition. The maximization principle enables economists to establish mathematical descriptions of rational behavior and propose quantitative propositions for empirical testing. All these propositions are derived from the basic assumptions and are therefore necessary conditions for economic theory to be "true." If we stick to Sylberg's position, then our economic theory is not just instrumental. Because, if we ask the basic hypothesis of theory to be consistent with the actual experience, then the various propositions derived from theory are the correct description of the modern world; here, all propositions are part of the real world, but some propositions have not yet been Reality may "become a reality." The epistemological foundation of mainstream economics only requires that the theory has good predictive power. You can observe sunspots as long as you can accurately predict economic fluctuations. This epistemological position contains a profound sense of empiricism, or, I can say, contains a profound "skepticism" consciousness, that is, the theoretical effort to suspect all Newtonian attempts to construct the structure of the universe. This kind of empiricism insists that human reason can only predict the future from statistical methods. As for the structural relationship hidden behind the statistical relationship, it can never be accurately recognized. This is not to say that mainstream economics has no theory. On the contrary, mainstream economics is full of various theories and various economic theories described by precise mathematics. However, all of these theories are “instrumental” and must be in a position to be tested and can be modified or abandoned at any time compared to actual experience. This position of the Chicago School has made the mainstream literature of mainstream economics, in addition to mathematical models, full of statistical and model checking processes. From the assumption of Adam Smith's humanity to the instrumentalist position of modern mainstream economics, this turning point has created the possibility that mathematical tools can be widely applied in economics.

We see that there is no evolutionary argument, and this turning point is untenable in epistemology; although in various social sciences other than economics, the position of evolution and the position of rationalism almost always conflict, always reflecting two The opposite epistemology. The "self-interest" hypothesis of economics from classical to modern, the root of its explanatory power is: when the majority of the group's behavior is efficiency-oriented, self-interested assumptions, whether instrumental or ontological phenomenology It is enough to explain the phenomenon of the plural. Because "efficiency" -- to achieve the stated goal with minimal effort, is a necessary condition for "self-interest". Therefore, contemporary mainstream economics is very close to the behavioral school method in sociology in terms of analytical methods. The extreme form of the latter is to assume people as animals with only "conditioned reflex" learning functions. We must admit that under this simplest assumption, the behavioral school has indeed gained a lot of explanatory power.

From the above discussion, we can see that when the prediction reality becomes the only requirement for the validity of the theory, the theoretical hypothesis can be completely separated from reality. In other words, we can make very "strong" theoretical assumptions, as long as it has predictions. ability. Many people who oppose self-interested assumptions, through a large number of surveys of entrepreneurs, suggest that these entrepreneurs seldom recognize or believe that their behavioral motives are to pursue "profit maximization." But this does not prevent mainstream economists from logically deriving a large number of propositions in line with the real world from the principle of "profit maximization". Because those efficient companies can be instrumentally considered to be pursuing maximum profits. From this, a proposition can be derived: once the majority of the group's behavior is no longer efficiency-oriented, the self-interest hypothesis will lose its ability to explain. This trend is very clear in the “post-industrial society”. When people have accumulated enough wealth to enter the "wealth-driven development stage" that Purtel is talking about, people will pursue the great richness of the spiritual world and pursue the in-depth development of cultural life instead of mainly pursuing material life. "effectiveness". In other words, there is such a possibility in human nature that when material life is rich, it is to pursue the abundance of spiritual life—at the expense of giving up “efficiency”. It is true that what is described here is the behavior of many individuals, not the actions of a few people, and not by the early existentialists, such as the creative individuals referred to by Dostoevsky and Kolkaigor. In my opinion, this is the first "crisis" that economic rationalism must face. This is closely related to the above-mentioned production methods of modern society, knowledge and human capital accumulation.

Second, in many levels of social evolution, “competition” does not necessarily become the main driving force for evolution. This is especially evident in cultural life. Our requirements for cultural “products” are not based on “efficiency” but on “diversification”. The more diverse and complex the cultural life, the richer and more meaningful it is. Here, the linear "evolutionary view" is the most unacceptable. Not only that, but we also found that too intense competition often kills the richness of culture. The most glorious cultural era in history has always been associated with the generous sponsorship of powerful dynasties, while the Hong Kong-style competitive environment rarely produces masterpieces. The reason is simple, competition will strengthen the “efficiency” motivation, and focusing on efficiency will make people alienate into a part of a simple operation but a huge machine. When we find that we have to "organize" to become richer, we are in danger of alienating into a simple part of a large machine. Van Buren said that culture is a kind of "luxury" and requires the creation of the so-called "free class." Modern psychology and cognitive science research believes that competition, although it can be a creative incentive for people, is more of a repression of creativity. In short, when competition is not the main driving force of evolution, the evolutionary argument of economic rationalism has been shaken. In other words, even with an instrumentalist position, the evolutionary arguments of self-interested assumptions are difficult to establish. From this, we can ask: Why do we impose this "self-interest" assumption? It is now completely redundant; not only that, it even makes evolution a process that is too simple and will eventually die out. This seems to me to be the second "crisis" that economic rationalism must face.

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